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Glossary 
 
CLA  Construction Licence Application (in accordance with the Nuclear 
Energy Act), which Posiva submitted in December 2012 
DiP  Decision-in-Principle (in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act) 
Fennovoima   Power company established in 2007. It plans to build a new NPP unit at 
Pyhäjoki, Finland. 
FPH  Fortum Power and Heat Fortum Power and Heat Ltd (formerly IVO), 
part of Fortum Consortium, the State of Finland is the biggest 
shareholder of Fortum with an over 50 per cent holding. Fortum Power 
and Heat operates the NPP at Loviisa and owns 25,8 per cent of TVO 
GD  Government Decree 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
IVO  Imatran Voima Ltd, 100 per cent state-owned power company 
established in 1932. Known as Fortum Power and Heat since 1998 
KBS-3  Kärn bränsle säkerhet (nuclear fuel safety), Swedish concept for final 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Number 3 indicates that this is the third 
conceptual description of the repository system drawn up by SKB since 
1976 
KBS-3H   KBS-3H and KBS-3V are the two design alternatives of the KBS-3 spent 
fuel disposal method. KBS-3H is the horizontal deposition alternative 
for vertical reference design 
KBS-3V   KBS-3H and KBS-3V are the two design alternatives of the KBS-3 spent 
fuel disposal method. KBS-3V is vertical deposition alternative, which is 
the reference design 
MEE  Ministry of Employment and the Economy (formerly the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry) 
MTI  Ministry of Trade and Industry 
NEA  Nuclear Energy Agency 
NH4  Ammonium, chemical name  
NWM  Nuclear Waste Management 
NWM-2012  Nuclear Waste Management at Olkiluoto and Loviisa Power Plants: 
Review of Current Status and Future Plans for 2013-2015 (Posiva’s 
Nuclear waste management programme 2012. In Finnish: YJH-2012 – 
Olkiluodon ja Loviisan voimalaitosten ydinjätehuollon ohjelma vuosille 
2013–2015 
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NPP  Nuclear Power Plant 
OL1-4  Nuclear power plant units at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki, OL1-2 are in 
operation, OL3 is under construction and OL4 in planning 
ONKALO  Posiva’s underground rock characterisation facility 
PASS  Project on Alternative System Studies 
pH  Stand for "power of hydrogen", it is a measure of the molar 
concentration of hydrogen ions in the solution and a measure of the 
acidity 
Posiva  Nuclear waste management company owned by Teollisuuden Voima 
(60 per cent) and Fortum Power and Heat (40 per cent), established in 
1995 
Pre-CLA  pre-construction licence application, which was required from Posiva 
in 2009 before the official CLA in 2012  
R&A  Review and Assessment 
R&D  Research and Development 
RTD  Research, Development and Technical Design 
SKB  Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB, Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste 
Management Company 
SKBF  Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Company 
SNF  Spent Nuclear Fuel 
STUK  Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
TVO  Teollisuuden Voima Ltd, operates the NPP at Olkiluoto site in Eurajoki 
VLJ   Voimalaitosjäte, NPP’s low and intermediate level waste 
VTT  Technical Research Centre of Finland 
Weichselian-R  Climate Evolution Scenario 
YJH-2012   Olkiluodon ja Loviisan voimalaitosten ydinjätehuollon ohjelma vuosille 
2013–2015 (Nuclear Waste Management at Olkiluoto and Loviisa 
Power Plants: Review of Current Status and Future Plans for 2013-
2015; Posiva’s NWM 2012 – Nuclear waste management programme 
2012) 
YJT  Nuclear Waste Commission of the Finnish Power Companies 
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Abstract 
 
The risk of corrosion in oxygen-free water has become an issue of scientific controversy possibly even 
threatening the realisation of the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland and Sweden. In 
Sweden there has been extensive discussion about the issue since 2007, but only recently has this 
debate increased in Finland although the similar disposal concept (KBS-3) is applied in both countries. 
In this report, we analyse how the implementer, Posiva (a Finnish nuclear waste company), and the 
regulator, STUK (the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority), have been engaged in a 
dialogue on the risk of copper corrosion. For over thirty years the implementer and regulator have 
been engaged in a series of negotiations on the advancement of research, planning and technical 
design related to SNF disposal. The aim here is to determine 1) how the implementer, Posiva Oy, has 
presented the issue of copper corrosion and copper corrosion related research, 2) how the regulator, 
STUK, has assessed and reacted to what Posiva has presented and 3) what the long-standing risk 
dialogue tells about the transformation of the Finnish regulatory culture and relationship of the 
parties. Moreover, the study discusses the importance of risk dialogue at different stages of the risk 
governance processes and how the risk dialogue transforms the roles of the parties. The insight into 
the risk dialogue between Posiva and STUK was gained by examining core documents regarding this 
interaction, namely the Research, Development and Technical Design (RTD) review process and the 
construction licence application (CLA) review process. From Posiva's side RTD programmes published 
in 2003, 2006 and 2009 and their successor, the Nuclear Waste Management (NWM) programme 
published in 2012 were studied. When examining STUK, we analysed the statements by the regulator 
to the Ministry of Employment and Economy (MEE) on the basis of Posiva’s reports. Posiva’s pre-
licence construction application (pre-CLA) in autumn 2009 and STUK’s review of it were also included 
in the analysis. As the STUK’s review of Posiva’s construction licence application, submitted in 2012, 
is still under way, only Posiva’s application has been examined.  
Finnish nuclear waste risk governance is characterized by a strong role of central actors, STUK and 
Posiva with little or no opportunity for public participation. The Finnish regulatory culture is deemed 
flexible, development oriented and, as such, oriented towards gradual learning and refinement. The 
results of the risk dialogue study suggest that Posiva’s reporting evolved from merely presenting a 
situation, to more focused and extensive discussions. The investigation of the dialogue showed that 
STUK exercised its right to demand further information, while the implementer, Posiva, was 
compelled to comply with the requirements. Nevertheless, the organisations appeared to operate 
consensually, meaning that they both pursue the successful development of a safe repository for 
SNF, indicating rapprochement and transformation of clear-cut roles. However, the results show that 
under the normal steady flow of interaction, risk governance process is oriented towards mutual 
learning and improvement, but at the time of crucial decision-making extra tensions come into 
relationship. In the ideal cases the roles of implementer and regulator should be clear-cut, but the 
study of long-standing interaction indicates that the engagement in dialogue has transformed STUK’s 
role in the direction of development-orientation. Thus shifting STUK’s input to the advancement of 
the project gives it a sort of consultative role, while at the time of crucial decision-making the role of 
regulator is strengthened.  
 
Keywords: Risk governance, regulation, nuclear waste disposal, copper corrosion 
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1 Introduction 
The risk of corrosion in oxygen-free water has become an issue of scientific controversy possibly 
threatening even the realisation of the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) (Andersson 2014, 2; 
Wallace 2010). In Sweden there has been extensive discussion about the issue since 2007 (Andersson 
2014; SNCNW 2013), but only recently has this debate increased in Finland (Lempinen & Lempinen-
Silvan 2011; Nurmi et al., 2012; Litmanen et al., 2012; FANC 2013; Klötzer et al. 2013).  
While the main dispute is about the ability of copper canisters to resist corrosion in nearly oxygen-
free geological conditions after the closure of the repository, there are also more discussions 
regarding other types of corrosion related to these canisters. The theme of copper corrosion has a 
long scientific history in the Swedish KBS-3 method (King et al., 2002: 137). These canisters, 
containing SNF, will be surrounded by bentonite clay at a depth of approximately 500 metres in the 
bedrock. The current scientific assumption is that that copper corrodes at an extremely slow rate in 
such an environment and oxygen free corrosion does not happen (see e.g. King 2010; Posiva 2013, 
434-436). However, as Andersson (2014) has indicated, this assumption has been challenged by 
experimental results of researchers working at the Royal Institute of Technology in Sweden. The 
researchers are suggesting that copper could corrode in an oxygen-free environment by taking 
oxygen from water molecules. This continuation of general corrosion could mean that the canister 
would not withstand the final disposal conditions for a 100,000-year lifetime, if the thickness of 
copper were five centimetres as planned (Hultquist, 1986; Szakálos et al. 2007).  
In this report, we analyse how the implementer, Posiva (a Finnish nuclear waste company), and the 
regulator, STUK (the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority), have dealt with the issue of 
copper corrosion in general. We look at the dyadic risk communication between these two 
organisations regarding copper corrosion related issues as they negotiate risks. The study design 
resembles Wärnbäck’s (2012) extensive analysis of expert dialogue between the Swedish Nuclear 
Waste company, SKB, regulatory authorities and the Government. She studied the long lasting 
interaction and engagement between the parties with special focus on the production of the 
industry’s research programmes and the authorities’ official statements of opinions on these 
programmes. As in Sweden (Wärnbäck 2012; Wärnbäck et al. 2013), in Finland, too, the implementer 
and regulators have been engaged in a series of conversations on the advancement of research, 
planning and technical design related to SNF disposal. Even though the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy (MEE) has the general regulatory power in the disposal of SNF waste1, the study of 
dyadic interaction between STUK and Posiva is important, because these two organisations negotiate 
SNF disposal risks and are tied together by legislation (see section 3).  
The structure of the report is as follows: first we discuss risk dialogue as a part of risk-related 
decision-making, then we move to describe the Finnish regulatory culture in its institutional settings 
before reporting on methodological choices and formulating the research questions. The main 
empirical findings are presented in four sections covering each of the phases of risk dialogue studied. 
The final section of the paper discusses the findings and draws conclusions. 
                                                          
1
 MEE decides on the principles and creates timetables which must be followed by the power companies. 
Construction permits and operating licences for nuclear facilities in Finland are issued by the Government, and 
the MEE receives applications and prepares decisions for the Government. This involves collecting and 
summarising the statements and views on the application, preparing the licence text with appropriate 
conditions, and presenting the case to the Government for decision. A prerequisite for any licence is safety. 
(Laaksonen 2006, 50) 
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2 Risk dialogue as part of risk-related decision-making 
In this study we are interested in risk dialogue as a fundamental part of risk-related decision-making. 
Risk-related decision-making can be characterized as a question of addressing complex cause-effect 
relationships and trade-offs in trying to reach commonly acceptable agreement together with 
different involved parties (Renn 2008: 275-284; Gregory et al., 1995; Amendola, 2001; OECD, 2002; 
Fahlbruch et al., 2006). While the mainstream risk communication literature focuses on how expert 
organisations communicate risks to stakeholders (Irwin 2008; Bucchi & Trench 2008), the aim of the 
study is to enhance the understanding regarding the socio-technical nature of risk governance and 
how the definition of risk and safety takes place in dialogue structured by risk regulation. Therefore 
the exchange of information between experts and expert organisations is central to risk assessment 
and management. Previously the role of cooperation among experts and policy-makers was 
underestimated, but now it is clearly understood to be an important prerequisite for risk governance 
and being at the heart of regulatory cultures (Renn 2008: 202-203; Wärnbäck 2012). What makes risk 
related decision making particularly interesting socio-technical process is that it depends not only 
upon systematic scientific knowledge, but also upon legally prescribed procedures and social values. 
(Renn 2008: 358-361) 
Risk dialogue is seen here as an interactional communicative co-construction, where 1) central 
institutional risk governance organisations define safety priorities, negotiate agendas for scientific-
technological research programmes and advance a socio-technical project set out in official political 
decision-making, 2) the importance, relevance, sufficiency and validity of scientific research on the 
safety of SNF disposal plans are negotiated and co-produced, 3) certain aspects of scientific findings 
or technological risks are accentuated and others downplayed in order to gain the support of target 
stakeholders, convince the decision-makers, fulfil the priority set in advance for the overall project 
and to reach governmental permission to implement the plans. (Dewulf et al., 2004; 2009; Fairman 
et al. 2012; Risley 2011) 
In spite of the fact that the conceptualisation of the term ‘risk’ varies depending on the discipline and 
the approach (Slovic, 1999; Althaus, 2005; Breakwell, 2007; Renn, 2008; Zinn, 2008), the regulatory 
authorities in different countries have to manage and regulate nuclear waste risks irrespective of the 
difficulties (Sjöberg, 2000; 2002; Elam et al. 2010, 8-9; Vuorinen 2008, 678-679; OECD 2003, 9-10). 
Although there is a tendency to involve many stakeholders in risk-related decision-making, we share 
the view of some researchers who emphasize that the institutionalisation of risk governance has led 
to risk professionals and expert organisations being given a powerful role in risk regulation (Renn, 
2008: 203-204; Beck, 1992; OECD, 2002). In many cases powerful expert organisations have 
significant power to frame issues and conceptualise debates (Dewulf et al., 2009: 166). However, one 
must see that risk communication is not free of constraints, because it takes place within certain 
institutional settings (Renn 2008, 215-217) and sociocultural contexts. (Kasperson et al. 1988; 
Kasperson et al. 2001) 
For us risk communication is either a two-way or a multidimensional process, meaning that it can 
also be seen as an interactive risk dialogue between the parties involved (Golding, 1994; Breakwell, 
2000; Palenchar, 2005; Breakwell, 2007; Palenchar and Heath, 2007; Venables et al., 2009; Sellnow 
and Sellnow, 2010). Thus risk definitions, regularly perceived as purely technical issues, are truly 
dynamic socio-technical processes, where information and knowledge are produced, communicated 
and processed among individuals, social groups and organisations regarding risks to health, safety 
and environment. (Breakwell, 2000: 110-111; Irwin 2008; OECD, 2002; Sellnow and Sellnow, 2010) 
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3 Development oriented regulatory culture in institutional settings 
Four regulatory cultures have been distinguished in the literature: 1) the adversarial approach is 
characterized by an open forum for different actors to compete for social and political influence in 
the respective policy arena and stakeholder involvement is seen to be mandatory, 2) the fiduciary 
approach resembles the decision-making process, where a group of patrons are obliged to make the 
‘common good’ the guiding principle in their action and public involvement is almost entirely 
excluded, e.g., in issues related to policy formulation or important negotiations, 3) the consensual 
approach is based more on a closed circle of influential actors negotiating behind closed doors and 
stakeholder participation is only required to the extent that the group needs further insights from 
the affected groups or that the composition of the group is challenged and 4) the corporatist 
approach comes close to a consensual approach, but is far more formalized in the sense of the 
representation of major forces of society. (Renn 2008, 358-361)  
These regulatory styles are difficult to find in absolutely pure forms in the countries studied. For 
instance, the Finnish regulatory culture in the case of nuclear regulation is a mixture of fiduciary and 
consensual approaches, because of the prominent role of the central actors, STUK, the nuclear 
industry and the MEE, and little or no opportunity for public participation. Due to a stepwise 
decision-making and implementation process, the regulatory process is stepwise. In practice, this 
means that the Finnish regulatory culture is flexible, development oriented and, as such, oriented 
towards gradual learning and refinement. As NEA has described, this kind of process facilitates the 
development of regulations in a gradual way, starting from very general principles and ending with 
the guidance applicable to a licencing review. In this way the job of regulating is intrinsically one of 
gradual learning and refinement (NEA 2003, 12). This Finnish model of “informal” dialogue between 
implementer and regulators is seen to require 1) strong social trust in the regulatory authorities, 2) a 
well-defined interaction process that ensures public confidence and ensures that decision-making in 
regard to licencing is not subsequently constrained or compromised in the legal or “quasi-judicial” 
sense (NEA 2003, 10). The regulatory philosophy of gradual learning is characterised by saying that it 
provides more opportunity for a constructive dialogue between regulator and implementer, which 
can be beneficial for the development of technical procedures, but also leaves room for 
interpretations and control by the authorities (NEA 2003, 12-13; see also Laaksonen 2006, 59-60.) 
The example NEA gives is the reply STUK’s former Director General Laaksonen gave when he was 
asked about the knowledge base of their review of the Decision-in-Principle (DiP). Laaksonen’s 
pragmatic response was to point out that in the DiP stage; no definitive conclusion on the safety of 
the proposed disposal concept was required. Only a preliminary safety appraisal was needed stating 
that nothing had been found that would raise doubts about the feasibility of achieving the required 
safety level (NEA 2003, 12-13). Laaksonen (2006) himself has described the interaction and 
communication with the licencees as being open and easy. The parties can make informal direct 
contacts any time in case of confusion, differences in views or urgent needs. If a regulatory decision 
is intended to be different from the one proposed by the licencee, the licencee is always contacted 
and granted an opportunity to present comments or further arguments before a formal decision is 
made. Laaksonen emphasises that in regular meetings, arranged several times a year, even small 
concerns can be raised and discussed in an informal manner with the licencees. (Laaksonen 2006, 59-
60.) Laaksonen (2007, 4) has also emphasised the regulators’ need for an independent safety 
assessment capability, i.e. research, to assure both themselves and the general public on the safety 
of the disposal concept. R&D for nuclear waste management in Finland is the responsibility of the 
licencees. As the regulator STUK has access to research and STUK is vested with some power to 
influence the preparation of public R&D. Therefore, according to Laaksonen “the need and 
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importance of nationally coordinated research is not as big as in the area of nuclear power plant 
safety”. 
However, Posiva’s and STUK’s risk dialogue takes place in legally and institutionally defined settings. 
In accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987)2, the power companies Teollisuuden 
Voima Ltd (TVO) and Fortum Power and Heat Ltd. (FPH) are responsible for their own waste. For 
managing SNF the power companies have established a joint company, Posiva, which is procedurally 
connected to STUK, because 1) STUK regulates the safety of the handling, storage and disposal of 
nuclear waste, 2) the authorities have issued reporting obligations to the producers of nuclear waste 
and STUK’s role is to monitor companies, 3) STUK reviews Posiva’s studies and technical plans for 
final disposal with the aid of other expert organisations and gives feedback to Posiva3, 4) STUK 
conducts the safety review in each of the licensing processes4, 5) STUK is given powers of search and 
entry, access to records, power to take samples and install monitoring devices, power to require the 
operator to submit reports and the ability to give directions about the manufacture of equipment, 6) 
STUK can also direct Posiva to make changes to the physical structure of a nuclear facility and to 
operating practices and procedures and 7) all STUK’s regulatory costs are recovered from the 
licencees. (OECD 2008; Laaksonen 2006)  
STUK’s regulation is constrained by two powerful decisions. Firstly, the Nuclear Energy Act 
establishes the principle that all nuclear waste which has been generated in Finland must be 
handled, stored and finally disposed of in Finland. Secondly, the Government has made and 
Parliament ratified a decision-in-principle according to which the spent fuel produced by the NPP 
units shall be disposed of in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki. STUK’s former director Tero Varjoranta has described 
the importance of DiP by saying that in the eyes of STUK Posiva’s DiP in 2001 made the company also 
a construction organisation besides its earlier role as a research and development organisation. 
(Nikula et al, 2012, 73) 
In addition to this, STUK and Posiva both interpreted that the political part of the licencing ended 
when the Finnish Parliament ratified the DiP in 2001 (Äikäs 2013; Isaksson 2007). The DiP is seen as 
Governments answer to the main political question: is the proposed build nuclear facility in line with 
the overall good of the society? According to Isaksson, Information Officer of STUK, (2007, 177) after 
ratification the processes directing towards construction permit and operating licence are more or 
less technical, i.e. not (so) political in nature. Posiva has also emphasized the importance of political 
consideration and decision in an early phase of the licensing process and thus indicating the 
                                                          
2
 The legislation regarding nuclear activities in Finland includes three main instruments: 1) the Nuclear Energy 
Act 1987 (990/1987), 2) the Radiation Protection Act 1991 (592/1991) and 3) the Nuclear Liability Act 1972 
(484/1972) (OECD 2008). However, the legislation concerning nuclear energy was updated in 2008. As part of 
the legislative reform, a number of the relevant Government Decisions were replaced with Government 
Decrees (GD). The Decrees entered into force on 1 December 2008. The Government Decision (478/1999) 
regarding the safety of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, which particularly applied to the disposal facility, was 
replaced by the Government Decree 736/2008, issued on 27 November 2008. (Posiva 2012a, 15) 
3
 Posiva is obliged to prepare triennial programmes for research, development and technical design (RTD), 
which STUK must review and publish an expert evaluation of the programme report. However, before it 
became obligatory, Posiva compiled the 2003 RTD voluntarily. 
4
 For major nuclear facilities, including spent fuel storages and disposal facilities, the nuclear legislation defines 
a three-step authorization process: 1) Decision-in-principle; the Government makes the licencing decision, prior 
approval by the host municipality and ratification by Parliament are required; 2) Construction licence, issued by 
the Government, 3) Operating licence, issued by the Government. STUK is obliged to conduct the safety review 
in each of these licencing processes and the MEE prepares the licencing decisions. 
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commitment of society (Äikäs and Sundell, 2014, 8–9). Therefore both STUK and Posiva seem to 
support a clear division between the ‘technical’ and the ‘political’. As a result the licencing procedure 
is framed as a forum for technical expertise and therefore it can be characterized by presenting 
Renn’s two approaches: fiduciary and consensual. (Renn 2008, 359) 
This institutionally defined, decades long risk communication between the implementer and STUK 
has created a special relationship between the parties. Although this study traces dialogue from 
formal, legally regulated, interaction, informal interaction, which is difficult to trace and document, 
also deserves attention. This informal communication between the parties is significant as it creates 
interactional culture and some sense of togetherness. In general one can say that STUK has to 
balance between three sometimes conflicting roles in its regulatory tasks. STUK has a role of 1) 
expert where dialogue, cooperation, self-criticism and reflectivity are important, it has a role of 2) 
authority, where independence, mediated control and perceptions are important and it has 3) a 
public role where reporting, informing and openness are important. (Reiman and Norros 2002, 188) 
Wärnbäck et al. (2013) shed light on the development of a regulatory culture and the conflicting 
roles of the regulatory authority in Swedish nuclear waste management. Investigators state that the 
long-term shared experience and learning among government bodies and implementer have led to a 
convergence of perspective, narrowing options and potentially reinforcing implementer’s influence 
and power over policy. As Wärnbäck et al. (2013, 2214) state, besides convergence of the actors’ 
perspective another important question is the changing of roles. In Sweden the competent 
authorities that had been an integral part of this planning process, in their roles as interlocutory 
partners and as the formal reviewers of SKB’s research, became formal reviewers of the application 
when it was submitted (Wärnbäck et al., 2013, 2213–14). The researchers note that the disposal 
project began in 1973 as a joint concern for the state and the industry. However, pressure on the 
industry to introduce the solution alone was increased in 1977 when the Stipulations Act (SFS, 1977) 
came into force. One aim of the Act was that “the state should maintain a position outside the 
nuclear fuel safety (KBS) project in order to be able to pass independent judgment upon it”. 
(Wärnbäck et al, 2013, 2213-14; see also Elam and Sundqvist, 2009, 973) 
The Finnish regulatory framework and the relationship between the implementer and the safety 
authority are somewhat similar to those of Sweden. There are also differences – mostly of historical 
origin – between the countries in nuclear safety practices (Wahlström, 1999). In Finland the main 
actors have had close dialogue before the regulatory review of the CLA (Construction licence 
application) began (See Figure 1). Still, in the Finnish context responsibility and the nuclear waste 
management obligation of a licencee are perhaps more commonly used as an argument for the 
existing regulatory approach than the independence of the state in the review process. Wärnbäck et 
al. (2013, 2214) raise the question of clear roles and responsibilities for actors. They claim that a 
“clear separation of responsibilities between the implementer and the regulator is also a cornerstone 
of the Swedish legislation on nuclear waste management” (Wärnbäck et al., 2013, 2214). Clear roles 
and separation of responsibilities have also been deemed one key factor for success of the plan to 
dispose of SNF in Finland. For instance Äikäs and Sundell (2014, 8; see also Rasilainen, 2002, 9–10) 
note that “Finland has managed to build a system with clear responsibilities for nuclear waste 
management”. Furthermore they conclude that:  
“The success of ONKALO was based on a systematic long-term programme in which site 
selection research received an emphasis. (…) During its course the programme has been 
guided by a “do and see” strategy which has made possible the flexibility in the consideration, 
based on science and technology, between the alternatives for SNF management.”  
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This seems to indicate how the waste management company enjoyed its responsibility and flexibility 
as an implementer without any complaints about too strict regulation.  
Another factor affecting the regulatory culture is interaction with each other. We share the notion of 
Wärnbäck et al. (2013) that close cooperation over a long period of time might thus change the way 
the actors perceive themselves and others, as well as how they formulate their goals and aims. 
Therefore the roles and responsibilities are not always as clear as they have been claimed to be. For 
instance, Posiva’s preliminary (draft) licence documentation (submitted in 2009) which was required 
by the MEE was perceived as an exercise for the actual licence application review by STUK (Heinonen 
et al. 2014, 3). In general, the aim of the exercise was to improve the actual performance, which 
refers to the idea of learning and reflection with the aim of potential transformation of regulatory 
approach or some aspects of it. 
A similar aim of learning characterises the description of the dialogue process in general. According 
to Heinonen et al. (2014, 3–4): 
“The aim of the step-wise review, close follow-up and regular meeting with Posiva has been 
to identify the safety relevant issues and especially key safety concerns already before Posiva 
finalizes and submits the construction licence application. During the licence application 
preparatory phase STUK had a process for collecting and updating the position of key safety 
concerns with regular dialogue between STUK and Posiva. However, after a while it was 
acknowledged that addressing single safety concerns did not in many cases lead to a better 
overall understanding and sometimes the linkage to safety was not very clear. From this 
experience [there was] a need for more structured R&A [review and assessment] process.” 
The time of crucial decision-making is at hand. According to the Finnish timetable for nuclear waste 
management (originally set out in the Government’s policy decision of 1983), the nuclear waste 
company Posiva submitted a CLA for a final repository for spent nuclear fuel (SNF), including a safety 
case5, at the end of 20126 (cf. Posiva 2010c; Posiva 2012a, 2012b; Posiva 2013). From the perspective 
of the licencing procedure of nuclear facilities, the nuclear waste management project has reached 
the second of its three milestones. The Finnish Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987, §) defines a three-step 
                                                          
5
 Theoretically Posiva applies IAEA’s and NEA’s definition of safety case. It says that “A safety case is a synthesis 
of evidence, analyses and arguments that quantify and substantiate the safety, and the level of expert 
confidence in the safety, of a geological disposal facility for radioactive waste” (Posiva, 2008: 3). In concrete 
terms, the safety case consists of several complementary reports, which cover topics related to long-term 
safety, such as developments at the final disposal site and in the repository as well as changes that could 
occurring in the biotic environment thousands of years into the future. According to Posiva (2008), the 
reference period for the safety analyses spans some 250,000 years, which means that it also includes at least 
one ice age cycle. However, in their safety case there are also investigations which cover the next million years. 
(e.g., Posiva 2013: 399) 
6
 Posiva submitted the Decision in Principle (DiP) in May 1999. In May 2001, the Finnish Parliament ratified the 
DiP made by the government concerning a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility in Olkiluoto in the Eurajoki 
municipality. Two crucially important requirements for the acceptance were positive statements on the DiP 
application that had to be made by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) (Ruokola, 2000), and the 
municipality of Eurajoki. In ratifying the DiP, Parliament stated that the facility was “for the overall good of 
society” (Yhteiskunnan kokonaisetu todetaan PAPissa jonka tekee hallitus). Posiva emphasises that Finnish 
decision-makers, on both the local and national level, have approved, in general, not “only the site but also the 
technical disposal plan suggested in the application”. (Rasilainen, 2004: 7) 
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authorisation process consisting of 1) Decision-in-Principle (DiP) issued by the Government and 
ratified by Parliament, 2) the construction licence issued by the Government, and 3) the operating 
licence, also issued by the Government. As part of the procedure related to the first milestone, the 
DiP, which was issued in 2000, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) made a preliminary 
safety appraisal (Ruokola, 2000). At the present time, STUK is conducting a safety appraisal of 
Posiva's CLA’s safety case, as part of the procedure related to the second milestone of the 
authorisation process, the construction licence. According to the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987, §55) 
STUK is responsible for the supervision of safe use of nuclear energy, is to participate in the 
processing of licence applications and to provide expertise for other authorities. 
RTD work has continued for over 30 years7, but there are still some uncertainties regarding the KBS-3 
concept8. As the KBS concept is originally Swedish, Posiva has been cooperating closely with its 
Swedish counterpart, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) (Kojo and 
Oksa, 2014). Because of the similarities in the technical plans and safety cases they have had 
“extensive research cooperation covering the whole disposal technology.” (Posiva, 2010a, 12-13)9 
4 Research questions, data and method of the analysis 
The purpose of this study is to investigate dyadic risk communication and the exchange of risk-
related information among expert organisations. The case to be studied is the risk dialogue over 
copper corrosion between Posiva and STUK10 and how they deal with the challenge presented by it to 
the geological disposal. The analysis is thus country-specific, highlighting interesting features of the 
regulatory system of SNF disposal in Finland.  
Our aim is to determine 1) how the implementer, Posiva, has presented the issue of copper corrosion 
and copper corrosion related research in their RTD reports, 2) how the regulator, STUK, has assessed 
the challenge and reacted to what Posiva has presented, 3) how the risk of copper corrosion is co-
                                                          
7
 The disposal concept proposed in the DiP application has been the focus of research and development work 
conducted in Finland over the past thirty years. The target schedule and the objectives were originally defined 
in the Government Decision of 1983: 1) Interim progress reporting in 1985 and 1992: 2) Preparedness for the 
selection of a disposal site by the end of 2000: 3) Preparedness for the construction licence application by the 
end of 2010: 4) Preparedness for the commencement of disposal operations as of 2020. (Ruokola, 2000: 9) 
8
 The final disposal of SNF in Finland is based on the Swedish KBS-3 concept. The basic concept for the disposal 
of SNF rests on its encapsulation and emplacement in crystalline rock at a depth of about 500 m. Spent nuclear 
fuel is to be encapsulated in spheroidal graphite cast iron canisters that will have an outer shield made of 
copper. The surface of the canisters is to be protected by clay buffer isolating it from the rock. The canisters are 
to be placed in individual deposition holes in deposition tunnels. Tunnels are to be backfilled with materials of 
low permeability and closed. 
9
 SKB and Posiva have also sought to jointly promote pan-European cooperation in the field of geological 
disposal. The technology platform “Implementing Geological Disposal” was established for enhancing the 
cooperation. 
10
 STUK (the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority – an independent regulatory and research authority) issues 
its statements on the safety of nuclear facilities, e.g. licencing, to the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy. Administratively (e.g. concerning budget matters), STUK is under the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health, which is the administrative authority for the use of radiation, but licence applications for nuclear 
facilities are handled by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, which is the administrative authority 
for the use of nuclear energy. (IAEA, 2002: 37.) 
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constructed by Posiva and STUK and 4) what the long-standing risk dialogue reveals about the 
transformation of regulatory culture and relationship of the parties.  
The insight into the risk dialogue between Posiva and STUK was gained by examining core documents 
regarding this interaction, namely the Research, Development and Technical Design (RTD) review 
process and the construction licence review process. The analysis was made in two stages. In the first 
stage our focus was on the RTD review process, but as it became obvious that the construction 
licence review process was an organic, inseparable, part of this dialogue, it was included in the 
analysis. We are aware that our data is still able to illuminate only a part of a more complex picture 
of risk dialogue between the actors because we concentrate solely on the official written exchanges 
of information, but even here we had plenty of material to examine, and any larger study would, this 
time, have been beyond our scope. We are also aware that both Posiva and STUK have a larger 
research network behind them as they commission research institutions and consulting companies to 
carry out the investigations. Therefore, in practice, risk dialogue in the case of copper corrosion is 
more multidimensional as Posiva and STUK have also risk dialogue with other experts, not just 
between themselves.  
The RTD review process documents examined from Posiva's side are RTD programmes published in 
200311, 2006 and 2009, and their successor, the Nuclear Waste Management (NWM) programme 
published in 201212. The idea of the RTD programmes is to inform readers about the progress as well 
as the management of radioactive waste activities of Posiva for its owners, TVO and FPH. As the 
focus of the reports relies on the phase of development of the spent nuclear fuel disposal 
programme, the documents from 2003 to 2009 reflect the steps taken to prepare for the 
construction licence application and aim at showing the feasibility of the repository (Posiva, 2006: 
11). The name of the triennial programme changed to the NWM programme following the 
amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act that entered into force in 2009. According to Posiva (2012c, 
Summary, 12): 
"As the disposal programme for spent nuclear fuel advances to the construction licence phase 
and the focus of work aimed at final disposal changes from R&D to implementation, it has 
been deemed appropriate to change the name of the document into a nuclear waste 
management programme[…]" but it still "follows largely the same lines as its predecessors". 
The CLA review process documents examined are the pre-CLA, the actual CLA and essential parts of 
Posiva's 2012 Safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. 
                                                          
11
 The reason for focusing on the period 2003-2012 rests on two facts: 1) in 2003 the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (MTI, nowadays MEE) decided to postpone the deadline for Posiva’s construction licence application 
to the end of 2012 because it was expected that the timetable would be too tight for Posiva, 2) in 2003 Posiva 
started to publish triennial RTD-programmes instead of annual reporting to the supervising ministry TMI. 
According to the Nuclear Energy Act 1987 (990/1987) and the Nuclear Energy Decree, which regulate the 
nuclear waste management of Finnish nuclear power plants, the owners of NPP have to report at regular 
intervals to the TMI/ MEE how the companies in charge of SNF have planned to implement the nuclear waste 
management actions and its preparations. According to the Nuclear Energy Act Posiva was obliged to submit 
these reports yearly to the TMI/ MEE, but changes in the law in 2009 formalized the practice of Posiva and MEE 
already from the year 2003. The MEE had given Posiva an opportunity to report on their research, planning and 
technical design every three years instead of annual reporting. 
12
 In Finnish YJH-2012 stands for “Olkiluodon ja Loviisan voimalaitosten ydinjätehuollon ohjelma vuosille 2013–
2015”. In English “Nuclear Waste Management at Olkiluoto and Loviisa Power Plants: Review of Current Status 
and Future Plans for 2013-2015. (NWM-2012) 
 14 
 
When examining STUK13, we analyse the statements from the regulator to the MEE on the basis of 
Posiva’s reports. Additional material used in the analysis includes the appendices of the statements14  
that give more detailed accounts regarding the issues raised in the statements. In these documents, 
STUK, together with its experts, evaluates the RTD efforts and preparedness of the company’s 
application material, comments on the planned research, development and technical design of the 
spent fuel repository system and state of application material, making recommendations regarding 
the further development. 
In the first stage, three RTD reports from Posiva and four statements with fifteen appendices on 
STUK were included in the analysis. In the second stage an NWM report, a pre-CLA with ten 
appendices, a CLA licence with eight appendices and seven safety case documents from Posiva and 
three statements with two appendices on STUK were included. The chosen documents were read 
focussing on the copper corrosion issue. In the data analysis, both copper corrosion and (if not 
specified) the corrosion issue in general, were taken into account. However, other forms of corrosion 
that do not relate to copper (e.g. the corrosion of iron inserts, reinforcement materials or some of 
the metal parts of the fuel assemblies) were excluded from the research, as they did not fit into the 
frame of the present study. In order to present the results in a reader-friendly way, we decided to 
mention just a few examples to illustrate those issues that were discussed and have placed the rest 
of copper corrosion related information in a table summarising all the results in the timespan 
covered. 
The design of our study rests on a fairly complex scheme (see Figure 1) that follows the sequence of 
the dialogue between Posiva and STUK. The risk dialogue we have investigated can be divided into 
two parts: 1) the RTD review process and 2) the CLA review process. The progress of Posiva’s RTD on 
the possibility for an underground nuclear waste repository is influenced by continuous exchanges of 
information with STUK (illustrated with arrows) as well as the official statements of the authority 
(illustrated with arrows) that were developed on the basis of the RTD reports. The statements made 
by STUK were influenced by the risk communication conducted with Posiva. Statements by the MEE 
on the grounds of STUK’s review statements are not included in the data and are not mentioned in 
Figure 1. As Figure 1 indicates, it was only after 2009 that the CLA review started to affect the RTD 
review process. STUK´s pre-CLA review influenced STUK’s own 2010 RTD review and Posiva’s new 
NWM-2012 programme. STUK’s pre-CLA review also affected Posiva’s 2012 CLA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 STUK is obliged to control the safety of nuclear facilities in Finland. This control has two dimensions: 1) the 
evaluation of plans and analyses pertaining to the plant, and 2) the inspection of plant structures, systems and 
components as well as that of operational activity. 
14
 STUK’s archive record numbers: 5/H48112/2009 tks2009 lausunto; Y811/123 tks2006 lausunto; Y811/43 
tks2003 lausunto. 
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Figure 1. The flow of risk dialogue between Posiva and STUK 
 
 
5 Risk dialogue between Posiva and STUK 
5.1 Years 2003 and 2004: Setting the stage 
In 2003 and 2004 there were many uncertainties regarding the issue of copper corrosion. 
Nevertheless, Posiva seemed to stay optimistic, while hoping for favourable results from future 
studies and improved insight into unclear matters related to copper corrosion. On the other hand, 
STUK (2004: 2) considered Posiva’s RTD report of 2003 as a general overview of the situation at that 
time and expected answers to many questions and concrete technological choices to be made in the 
near future. A summary of all copper corrosion related issues that were covered in 2003 and 2004 is 
presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Summary of the copper corrosion related issues discussed by Posiva and STUK in 2003 and    
2004. 
Issues Discussed 
Posiva Oy STUK 
 
 
- Canister holding the spent nuclear fuel for more than 
100,000 years 
 
- International collaboration while investigating copper 
corrosion (e.g. the behaviour of copper corrosion in 
sulphide containing compacted bentonite) 
 
- Conducted research on: 
- general corrosion in oxygen free and saline conditions 
- localised corrosion (pitting or stress corrosion 
cracking) 
- impact of redox conditions 
- effects of methane  
- effects of high-pH conditions  
 
- Other issues:  
- grain size of the copper  
- unlikely microbial impacts 
- thickness of the copper shell  
- participation in the international co-operation group 
“GAMBIT Club”  
 
- Aspects that need further research:  
- evolution of redox conditions  
- localised corrosion processes 
- chemical conditions 
- general corrosion in oxygen free and saline conditions 
 
 
- Expected lifespan of the canister mitigates numerous 
concerns  
 
- Consideration needed on: 
- temperature in some designs may produce 
mineralogical alterations & changes in volume due to 
corrosion of canisters may exert pressures on buffer 
and rock  
- ability of a thinner copper shell to stand corrosion  
- possible manufacturing defects 
- groundwater conditions in the bedrock of Olkiluoto 
- copper corrosion model in sulphide containing 
compacted bentonite   
 
- Clarifications needed on:  
- formation and expansion of corrosion products and 
related processes 
- interactions with canister corrosion products and the 
possibility of adverse effects on repository safety or 
reliability 
- choice to focus on interface kinetic studies on copper 
corrosion 
- possibility of localised corrosion due to NH4 in 
groundwater 
- references concerning the effects of pH on corrosion 
- possible presence of impurities in methane at the site 
    
- Aspects that need further research:  
- creep behaviour of the copper canister  
- welding equipment and parameters  
- local corrosion forms 
- residual stresses 
- long-term properties of the copper canisters produced 
by according to different methods 
- stress corrosion cracking 
- microbial copper corrosion 
 
 
Starting from the first RTD report in a new series of these documents, Posiva endeavoured to pave 
the way for transparent dialogue with relevant parties. According to the organisation (Posiva, 2003: 
1, 267), the programme aimed to enhance transparency and enable:  
“External review and discussion of the objectives, the achievements and the future emphases 
of the programme to take place. In this way, dialogue should be promoted between the 
various stakeholders on issues related to the process of disposal system development.”  
With respect to the specifications of the canister for the isolation of spent nuclear fuel, Posiva (2003: 
36) argued that canister design rests in the assumption that it is “watertight and airtight, corrosion 
 17 
 
resistant and mechanically solid”. According to the company, a great deal of research conducted over 
20 years by SKB as well as its counterpart and collaborator, Posiva, proved the suitability of copper 
for spent nuclear fuel isolation. The organisation stated that “available evidence supports” the claim 
that the canister can hold the waste for more than 100,000 years. Nevertheless, it simultaneously 
admits the need for further research. (Posiva, 2003: 119) 
At the time of the emergence of RTD report 2003, Posiva and SKB together with Canadian partners 
were engaging in a joint three-year project (2002–2005) focusing on the development of the model 
enabling the prediction of “the long-term corrosion behaviour of copper canisters in sulphide 
containing compacted bentonite”. In addition to this, the company and its Swedish counterpart were 
concentrating on such experimental and theoretical research as general corrosion in oxygen free and 
saline conditions, localised corrosion, the impact of redox conditions on corrosion as well as the 
effects of methane and of high-pH conditions on corrosion. (Posiva, 2003: 119-120)  
Some research tackling the above mentioned issues is presented in Posiva’s 2003 RTD report. With 
respect to general corrosion in oxygen-free conditions and salinity, the company cites a couple of 
contradictory studies and concludes that the issue still needs further research in conditions as similar 
as possible to those of the repository. Further research is also needed on the possibility of localised 
corrosion that could cause an early failure of the copper shell. The impact of redox conditions on 
corrosion, with an unclear duration in the initial toxic period as well as estimates regarding relevant 
chemical, electrochemical and microbiological processes, is recognised as one more area of 
uncertainty. (Posiva, 2003: 120-121)  
Regarding the effects of methane on corrosion, Posiva argued that, according to the literature 
reviewed, methane has no negative effect on copper (Posiva, 2003: 121). Finally, with respect to the 
effects of high-pH conditions on corrosion, Posiva (2003: 121) stated that a high pH would lead to the 
passivation of the canister surface, which would increase the stability of the canister as well as its 
ability to prevent local corrosion. Posiva (2003: 245-246) promised to address the uncertainties 
related to copper corrosion in a forthcoming period (and indicated that would be in 2004).  
Although Posiva’s RTD report in 2003 provided a detailed overview in which the main issues 
regarding copper corrosion were thoroughly and logically addressed (Read, 2004: 8), STUK and its 
reviewers made numerous comments, questions and requirements about the need for further 
research concerning the challenge. In relation to Posiva’s estimated lifetime of the canister, 
Hänninen (2003: 2) highlighted that the isolation of the waste in the canisters for more than 100,000 
years as a much longer timespan “compared to the operation time of any other industrial product”, 
while Apted et al. (2004: 11) believed that Posiva belittled numerous concerns about the repository. 
Therefore, Posiva was urged to consider, for instance, the manufacture of the canisters, the materials 
to be used and their mechanical characteristics, in order to be able to consider all forms of corrosion 
and other risks. (Hänninen, 2003: 2) 
While commenting on copper corrosion, STUK, together with its reviewers, highlighted some aspects 
that Posiva must take into consideration. For example, Apted (2004: 10) noted that temperature 
might play a role in mineralogical alteration for some designs. Changes in volume due to the 
corrosion of the canister had to be taken into account while studying chemical interactions between 
the backfill and the buffer. Hänninen (2003: 2) agreed with Posiva that a thinner copper shell would 
be advantageous, but he also pointed out the need for proof that the shell would withstand 
corrosion. STUK (2004: 5) pointed out that groundwater conditions were more demanding in the 
bedrock of Olkiluoto than in the VLJ cave, and this must be kept in mind when interpreting the 
results of copper corrosion research. Moreover, Read (2004: 9) expressed his full support for the 
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joint Posiva and SKB project, focusing on the development of “a corrosion model for copper in 
sulphide media containing compacted bentonite”. 
STUK and its reviewers stated that they would require more research on various issues. For instance, 
Hänninen (2003: 8) and Apted et al. (2004: 11-12) demanded that the representative creep 
behaviour of the copper canister be tested to avoid canister corrosion. Posiva was also asked to 
investigate and develop the equipment and welding parameters of the high-energy method to be 
used for the welding of copper (Hänninen, 2003: 4-6). More precise information was called for 
regarding local corrosion forms, stress corrosion cracking and microbial copper corrosion (STUK, 
2004: 3; Hänninen, 2003: 5-8). For more requirements see Table 1. 
 
5.2 Years 2006 and 2007: Focus on future projections 
The discussion of Posiva and STUK expanded during 2006 and 2007 to consider the future prospects 
of and the possible concerns related to the long-term corrosion behaviour of copper in changing 
repository conditions. The increasing attention given to the issue of copper corrosion related issues 
in Posiva’s 2006 RTD report naturally suggested that, during the three-year period, the company 
gained more information and clarity on the issues, but was simultaneously confronted with 
continuing uncertainties. STUK conceded the advances in Posiva’s knowledge but once again 
required more information about certain issues related to the corrosion processes. Table 2 
summarizes the issues related to the copper corrosion that the target organisations mentioned in 
their documents during 2006 and 2007. 
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Table 2 Summary of the copper corrosion issues discussed by Posiva and STUK in 2006 and 2007 
Issues discussed 
Posiva Oy STUK 
 
 
- General and local corrosion extensively studied 
 
- Interrelationship between various forms of corrosion and 
oxygen-free, saline, chlorine and alkaline conditions as 
well as the effects of temperature and pH 
 
- Unlikeliness of: 
- stress corrosion cracking 
- emergence of discontinuities in the welded joint that 
may induce local corrosion and stress corrosion 
cracking 
- occurrence of sulphate-reducing bacteria contributing 
to uniform corrosion 
 
- Impacts of foreign materials  
 
- Interactions between cement, its additives and the 
canister 
 
- Corrosion processes in evolving conditions during 
repository construction and climate change  
 
- Aspects that need further research:  
- long-term corrosion behaviour of copper in the 
repository environment  
- microbial induced corrosion 
- corrosion in anoxic and saline conditions as well as 
compacted sulphide-containing bentonite  
- welding and the potential occurrence of corrosion  
- effects of acetates on corrosion 
 
 
- Improvements with respect to reporting and technical 
development 
 
- Clarifications needed on:  
- long-term properties of the canister  
- risk of canister failure due to creep or stress corrosion 
- interrelation of groundwater and copper corrosion 
- copper corrosion caused by sulphate-reducing 
bacteria  
- stress corrosion cracking under reducing and oxidising 
conditions  
 
- Aspects that need further research:  
- long-term durability of technical barriers, in particular 
special attention needs to be paid to the 
interrelationship between the copper canister and 
bentonite  
- processes affecting the corrosion behaviour of copper 
- biogeochemical inputs of the engineered barrier 
system that affect copper corrosion  
- effects of sulphate on redox stability 
 
 
 
In the continuing dialogue between the parties, Posiva’s 2006 RTD report delineated the 
requirements, reviewed the steps taken during the previous three years and outlined further RTD 
issues for the upcoming period. The document dwelled on “technical performance of the disposal 
concept and of the engineering components in site-specific conditions”. Since the deadline for the 
submission of the construction licence application was approaching, the focus of this report shifted 
towards the “operational and long-term safety of the system” (Posiva, 2006: 11). 
When writing the RTD report for 2006, Posiva collected a substantial amount of knowledge regarding 
the corrosion of copper. The company (Posiva, 2006: 49) argued that such potential forms of 
corrosion processes in repository conditions as general and local corrosion were an extensively 
studied phenomenon, but information was still lacking on microbial induced corrosion. Stress 
corrosion cracking was deemed an unlikely process because of the small concentration of elements 
that induce stress corrosion cracking and the remarkably low corrosion potential values (Posiva, 
2006: 49, 197). In the report, Posiva (2006, 49-50, 71, 238) also described what it had learnt about 
the interaction between earlier mentioned forms of copper corrosion (including uniform and pitting 
corrosion) and the constantly evolving repository environment with a focus on oxygen-free, saline, 
chlorine and alkaline conditions, plus the effects of temperature and pH. Moreover, the possible 
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impacts of foreign materials on copper corrosion were considered in the report (Posiva, 2006: 257). 
For more comments on copper corrosion see Table 2. 
Besides the above mentioned issues, Posiva paid special attention to the changing repository 
conditions and expected corrosion processes during the planned lifespan of the repository. While 
dwelling upon possible changes, the organisation took into account both the repository construction 
phases (e.g. early post-closure, the post-closure saturated phase) and climate change periods relying 
on the Weichselian-R scenario e.g. permafrost, glacial melting. (Posiva, 2006: 196-201) Despite the 
lack of clear insight into upcoming changes, the document stated that the investigations carried out 
into long-term corrosion development support prior conclusions regarding the feasibility of the 
copper canister concept (Posiva, 2006: 208).  
Predictions about the long-term corrosion behaviour of copper in the repository environment are 
surrounded by numerous uncertainties, thus Posiva (2006: 62) said it would continue to research the 
issue. In addition, the future RTD efforts of the company were to be directed towards the 
investigation, for instance, of corrosion in anoxic and saline conditions as well as compacted 
sulphide-containing bentonite (Posiva, 2006: 50). Also, the company planned to continue studies on 
welding and the potential for corrosion as well as the effects of acetates (Posiva, 2006: 57-58, 140).  
According to STUK (2007a: 2), and a group of external experts, it continued to engage in dialogue 
with Posiva in relation to research into the repository and the construction of ONKALO. With 
reference to the progress of Posiva’s nuclear waste disposal programme during the past three years, 
the authority gave positive feedback on the reporting and technical development but simultaneously 
identified weaknesses and areas for further investigation.  
STUK (2007b: 2) criticised the report for failing to give a clear picture of the research and a lack of 
evidence concerning the long-term properties of the canister design and argued that the risk of the 
early failure of the canisters due to creep or stress corrosion had received too little attention in the 
document. Other uncertainties were related to the interrelation between groundwater and copper 
corrosion (STUK, 2007b: 4; Bath et al., 2007: 20). Moreover, further explanation was required 
regarding the worst case scenario for copper corrosion caused by sulphate-reducing bacteria (Read 
et al., 2007: 30). Finally, Hänninen et al. (2007: 27) noted that there was a lack of information about 
stress corrosion cracking under reducing and oxidising conditions. 
STUK, together with its reviewers, required more RTD efforts on numerous copper corrosion related 
issues. According to the authority, extensive research and mathematical modelling were still needed 
to ascertain the long-term durability of the technical barriers and that special attention needed to be 
paid to the interaction between the copper canister and bentonite. They also stated that the 
processes affecting the corrosion behaviour of copper also had to be investigated. (STUK, 2007a: 2.) 
Finally, Bath et al. (2007: 18-19, 20) asked for more investigation concerning the biogeochemical 
inputs into the engineered barrier system that impacts copper corrosion of the canister as well as the 
effects of sulphate on redox stability. 
 
5.3 Years 2009 and 2010: Diffusion of two processes 
In 2009 and 2010 Posiva and STUK focused on almost the same themes related to copper corrosion 
as in earlier documents. This may suggest that all the known strictly copper corrosion related issues 
had probably been identified by that time. Nevertheless, Posiva’s discussion of the corrosion 
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behaviour of copper in RTD documents was more extensive than before and paid considerably more 
attention to comments made by STUK. Moreover, overlapping the RTD programme Posiva, within the 
same year, produced the pre-CLA material required by the MEE. STUK, finding the pre-CLA material 
lacking in many ways in its statement, extended this criticism to the RTD programme, also looking at 
it in the light of its assessment of pre-CLA material. In its statements, STUK demanded a more holistic 
picture from Posiva and at the same time continued to demand answers to outstanding strictly 
corrosion related questions before the next milestone – putting together the CLA in 2012. A 
summary of the issues raised in connection with the risk of copper corrosion is presented in Table 3. 
Regarding the strictly copper corrosion related issues being raised, as the pre-licence material15 and 
RTD programme were submitted at roughly the same time, there were really no significant 
differences between the two – and these will be considered in connection with the latter. But what is 
interesting is that, from STUK's comments, it is obvious that Posiva and STUK were not on the same 
page regarding the pre-CLA material. Posiva had submitted something like a compilation of research 
accomplished, whereas STUK, in turn, had been expecting a more holistic view on what Posiva would 
present later in the actual CLA, as it found Posiva's material lacking in coherence, justifications and 
conclusions, and concentrating excessively on individual issues. STUK assessed that some ongoing 
tasks had become critical to the schedule and stated that the RTD programme concurrently in review 
would be assessed with the findings of the pre-licence review in mind. (Table 1; STUK, 2010a.)  
In the last actual RTD report, Posiva (2010b: 13) dealt with the topic of the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel generated by its owners and presented research as well as technical development and design 
work. For example, in the document, the company discussed the significance of the bentonite buffer 
that would surround the copper canister, and protect it from corrosion as well as other risks (Posiva, 
2010b: 292, 297-298, 309). Moreover, in relation to the chemical composition of groundwater, 
Posiva (2010b: 302-304) considered the potential for chloride corrosion, the unfavourable impact of 
solutes and other corrosive agents on the copper canister. Corrosion processes due to the influx of 
oxygen into the repository together with glacial melt water were also taken into account in the 
research and formulation of safety scenarios (Posiva, 2010b: 307, 358). In response to an earlier 
review by STUK, the document provided a discussion regarding various forms of copper corrosion 
(e.g. general corrosion, metal corrosion, localised corrosion, the inter-granular corrosion of copper in 
the welds, microbial induced corrosion), and did so with reference to different phases of the disposal 
of the canister (Posiva, 2010b: 356-357). For other issues that Posiva mentions, see Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 As Heinonen et al. (2014) explain, the MEE required Posiva to submit preliminary (draft) licence 
documentation by the end of 2009. It is not known what originally triggered this improvisation in the official 
timetable, but STUK noted that the reasoning was 1) to have a regulatory review of the status of the 
construction licence application, 2) to use it as an exercise for the actual licence application review and 3) to 
test the review process, review organization and assessment of preliminary safety case status. (Heinonen et al., 
2014, 3) 
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Table 3 Summary of the copper corrosion issues discussed by Posiva and STUK in 2009 and 2010 
(both RTD 2009 and Pre-CLA are included in the table). 
Issues discussed 
Posiva Oy STUK 
 
 
- Characterisation of the design and safety functions of the 
copper canister 
 
- Significance of the bentonite buffer 
 
- Chemical composition of groundwater and its impacts 
regarding chloride corrosion, solutes and other corrosive 
agents  
 
- Influx of oxygen to the repository together with glacial 
melt water 
 
- Stresses caused by welding and the possibility of stress 
corrosion cracking 
 
- Various forms of copper corrosion during different 
phases of the disposal of the canister 
 
- Unlikeliness of localised and uniform corrosion induced 
by salts and oxygen as well as interrelationships between 
material defects in the canister and corrosion and water 
 
- Avoiding extra corrosion by ensuring that maximum 
temperature between capsule and bentonite does not rise 
above +100 °C 
 
- Comparison of the KBS-3V and KBS-3H canister design 
models and the possibility of corrosion 
 
- Studies on the possibility of using copper as the canister 
over pack material (supercontainer) 
 
- Remaining uncertainties concern: 
- sulphate and methane interactions  
- foreign material, especially nitrogen compounds 
- evolution of sulphide concentration in groundwater 
 
- Aspects that need further research:  
- stress corrosion cracking due to evolving changes in 
both the climate and repository conditions  
- permissible material defects in the copper canister 
shell and weld  
- impacts of residual stresses  
- stress corrosion cracking due to the presence of 
oxygen, certain redox potential values, sulphide ions, 
and sulphide impacts under anaerobic conditions  
- unlikely but possible scenarios related to uniform 
corrosion induced by sulphide ions  
- bentonite buffer 
- localised increases in stress on the copper canisters  
- sulphate reduction process and its kinetics 
- copper corrosion in pure water  
 
 
 
Pre-licence application review: 
 
- Report concerning capsule design and knowledge and 
conclusions regarding copper corrosion has been delayed  
 
- Open safety issues regarding for example corrosion of 
the capsule 
 
- Broader considerations 
- Posiva has knowledge regarding design and 
performance of barriers but information is in great 
part presented incoherently and hard to trace 
- Performance targets have not been thoroughly justified 
and conclusions regarding applicability have not been 
presented  
- Models regarding safety affecting conditions are 
needed 
- Conclusions and arguments regarding favourability of 
the site are incomplete  
- How capsule works in different stages of different 
development paths should be studied 
- Connections between barriers and combined effects in 
case of barrier failure should be studied 
 
RTD review: 
 
- Substantial progress in copper corrosion research  
during 2007 and 2009 
 
- Taking into account the possibility that there may be 
some deficiently manufactured capsules  
 
- Aspects that need further research:  
- stress corrosion 
- copper corrosion in pure oxygen-free water  
- possible changes in the repository due to 
environmental conditions (e.g. groundwater or glacial 
melt water penetration of the repository)  
 
. 
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In the report, Posiva identified some areas of concern that needed further RTD. Although the 
company deemed stress corrosion cracking to be an unlikely phenomenon under the expected 
conditions, it admitted to the remaining uncertainties with respect to evolving changes in climate as 
well as repository conditions (Posiva, 2010b: 358-359). Therefore, Posiva planned to continue 
research, for instance, on possible material defects in the copper canister shell and weld as well as on 
the adverse impacts of residual stresses that might increase the risk of stress corrosion cracking 
(Posiva, 2010b: 208-209, 211-212, 239-240, 345-346, 358-359). Additionally, Posiva planned to 
investigate the potential for stress corrosion cracking due to the presence of oxygen, certain redox 
potential values, sulphide ions and sulphide impacts under anaerobic conditions (Posiva, 2010b: 359, 
362). With respect to canister evolution, the company said it was also going to study unlikely but 
possible scenarios related to uniform corrosion induced by sulphide ions (Posiva, 2010b: 362, 411). 
Posiva’s other research plans are mentioned in Table 3.  
STUK acknowledged the substantial progress that Posiva had managed to make with respect to 
copper corrosion and other issues during 2007 and 2009 (STUK, 2010b; STUK, 2010a: 2). 
Nevertheless, the body still required some clarifications because the material provided was 
incomplete on numerous safety issues related to the canister’s corrosion properties. STUK 
considered that Posiva had a lot of work to do regarding presenting issues coherently and drawing 
both conclusions and presenting justifications, and that the schedule for the CLA was going to be 
tight, as a sizeable part of the long term research would continue after 2012. STUK also stated that a 
situation in which safety related research and conclusions were presented after the submission of 
the licence application could delay its safety case review. (2010b, 1-2, index p.18) 
Although Posiva’s further analyses of copper corrosion indicated that spent nuclear fuel would be 
safely isolated for 10,000 years in the canister, STUK, once again, suggested taking into consideration 
the possibility, for instance, of some deficiently manufactured capsules that would not necessarily 
last for the required period (Hämäläinen, 2010: 4). Furthermore, stress corrosion, copper corrosion in 
pure oxygen-free water as well as possible changes in the repository due to environmental 
conditions (e.g. groundwater or glacial melt water penetrating the repository) were safety issues that 
would require more research in order to provide a clearer picture of the corrosion processes 
(Hämäläinen, 2010: 5; Heinonen 2010, 10, 14, 22; STUK, 2010b: 4). On broader considerations, STUK 
criticism related to the inadequate extent of the safety analysis and lack of a plan to show how the 
performance targets would be reached and in some cases even set. (2010b, 2-4) 
 
5.4 Years 2012 and 2013: Crisis in the relationship 
In 2012 and 2013 issues remained pretty much the same but the tone of STUK’s criticism changed as 
it considered that Posiva had not taken its earlier criticism seriously enough. Posiva’s CLA was 
submitted but was expected to be supplemented while STUK was reviewing it. A summary of copper 
corrosion related issues covered in 2012 and 2013 is presented in Table 4 and Table 5. 
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Table 4. Summary of the copper corrosion related issues discussed in NWM review process by Posiva 
and STUK in 2012 and 2013. 
Issues discussed 
Posiva Oy STUK 
 
 
- Posiva has updated its safety case plan 
 
- Conducted research on: 
- sulphide corrosion of copper 
- copper corrosion in pure water 
- oxygen carried to the disposal depth by glacial melting 
waters 
- stress corrosion cracking 
- dependence of stress corrosion on the redox potential  
- impacts of sulphide on stress corrosion cracking in 
anaerobic conditions potential  
- deformation caused by internal corrosion products 
- stress corrosion cracking in the insert 
- analyses for estimating the consequences of stress 
corrosion 
 
- Other issues:  
- estimating the consequences of stress corrosion  
- investigations into associated processes that may 
damage the canister 
- microbial activity in the buffer and backfill  
 
- Broader considerations 
- hydrogeological, hydro-geochemical and rock-
mechanical conditions and scenarios 
- performance of the buffer, backfill and closure 
solution 
- effects of foreign materials to conditions 
- effects of KBS-3H to conditions 
 
- Aspects that need further research:  
- copper corrosion in an oxygen-free aquatic 
environment 
- stress corrosion 
- geochemical evolution of the buffer and the backfill 
- manufacturing, assembly and sealing of the canister  
- closure solution  
- hydrogeological and geochemical conditions 
- target properties of and future evolution in the 
bedrock  
 
 
 
 
- Stated that NWM-2012 was insufficient, after response 
from Posiva supplementing timetables and references to 
documents submitted with construction licence 
application issued new statement finding that with the 
additions NWM-2012 fills the law’s requirements.  
 
- Posiva has largely focused on characterisation, setting 
performance targets and defining target properties. 
Assessed with the construction licence application review 
 
- Regarding the canister NWM-2012 refers to construction 
licence application documents making progress hard to 
assess 
- research information regarding the welding methods 
and stress inadequate 
- new information regarding stress corrosion and 
corrosion in oxygen free water lacking 
    
- Information regarding long term safety is limited 
Assessed with the construction licence application review 
 
- Aspects that need further research: 
- copper corrosion in an oxygen-free water 
- stress corrosion 
- welding stress and alternative welding method 
- performance of the backfill and closure solution 
- hydrogeological and geochemical conditions 
 
 
 
In the NWM report Posiva (2012) tried to respond to STUK’s criticism by updating its safety plan with 
extra care, taking feedback from STUK into account in the update. In fact, according to Posiva, it 
compiled the comments into detailed lists with an appended plan for taking them into account. In 
the programme Posiva identified research work done, for example, regarding the suitability of the 
site, future evolution of the system, barriers and canister (Posiva 2012 34-35, 46-98, 120-170). 
Although the NWM programme was to include future plans from 2013 to 2015 Posiva had chosen to 
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make an account of plans to year 2018. The list of aspects needing further research still appeared 
extensive and included many issues similar to those which had been under investigation already; 
however not many of them were strictly copper corrosion related issues (see Table 4).  
STUK rejected the NWM programme. According to STUK although Posiva planned in many instances 
to continue its research on the basis of projects started earlier, in many of these cases Posiva had not 
made clear how these related to safety, their contribution to safety and the time line of these 
projects. Also, according to STUK, Posiva had overestimated the time it had for the research to 
append to the licence application after it had been submitted. STUK stated that the information of 
the report regarding the long term safety was scarce and that it had already criticised the RTDs of 
2006 and 2009 for not presenting sufficient information in that regard. STUK stressed that although it 
had emphasised the significance of the analysis of how performance targets were met, Posiva had 
still not produced a plan to show how these performance targets would be reached. (STUK 2013, 1-5)  
After STUK's statement Posiva appended more comprehensive plans to the NWM regarding the 
schedules for the intended R&D. Regarding the issues concerning the long term safety, in its 
response Posiva referred in many cases to material submitted with the CLA. STUK deemed the 
appended NWM acceptable, but stated that regarding the long term safety that state of the plans 
would have to be evaluated as a part of the CLA review. 
 
5.5 Years 2012-2014: Posiva’s construction licence application under 
review 
Currently STUK is reviewing the CLA, which Posiva submitted at the end of 2012. The planned 
duration for STUK’s R&A is around two years and it is expected to be ready at the end of 2014 
(Heinonen et al., 2014; Rasilainen et al., 2014). After that STUK will continue to comprehensively 
monitor the subsequent detailed design, construction, manufacture and pre-operational testing, 
which will be followed by the R&A of the pending operation licence application (Heinonen et al., 
2014, 2). 
In the safety case of the CLA Posiva has assessed that there are no significant uncertainties 
concerning the general understanding of copper corrosion under aerobic and anaerobic conditions. 
They argue that the uncertainties in the general corrosion rate are relatively small and the rate can 
be expected to be less than 1 mm in 100,000 years. According to Posiva, the main uncertainties 
relate to the evolution of the near-field geochemical conditions. Nevertheless, the company 
announced that the possibility of pure water copper corrosion is being investigated to understand 
some of the results published in the literature. (Posiva 2012f, 129; Posiva 2012a, 154.) 
In the safety case submitted as a part of the construction licence application material Posiva (2012a, 
236) argues that:  
"[…]the proposed repository design provides a safe solution for the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel, and that the performance and safety assessments are fully consistent with all the legal 
and regulatory requirements […]. Moreover, Posiva considers that the level of confidence in 
the demonstration of safety is appropriate and sufficient to submit the construction licence 
application to the authorities."  
Posiva admits that there are some uncertainties, but asserts that these do not threaten the basic 
conclusions (Posiva 2012a, 236). The company state that their final disposal solution based on the 
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Swedish KBS-3 concept relies on a multi-barrier system. The view of the implementer is that copper 
in copper canisters provides corrosion resistance. Other barriers (buffer, backfill, plugs, closure and 
host rock), according to Posiva, contribute to predictable and favourable conditions for the canister, 
the buffer surrounding the canister protecting it directly from unwanted outside influences and other 
barriers contributing to the stability of the surroundings. (Posiva 2012d, Appendix 7, 12-13, Appendix 
16, 113; Posiva 2012a, Executive Summary, 9-10; Posiva 2012e, 51-54.) 
Performance targets and design requirements for the canister are set out in the design basis of the 
safety case (Posiva 2012e, 85-99). The report lists multiple corrosion mechanisms, such as localised, 
microbial and stress corrosion that need to be taken into account, naming oxygen and sulphide as 
the most important corrosive agents (see Table 5). Interestingly, however, it is claimed that the 
scientific evidence regarding copper corrosion in pure water is weak, and as the process moreover 
would be self-limiting, it is not taken into account in the design. Nevertheless, Posiva also explains 
that the process is under study. In addition, it is duly noted in the safety case that corrosion relates to 
the near-field chemistry and that all requirements related to it are, hence, also related to the 
corrosion resistance, and that these relations are explored in detail (Posiva 2012e, 88-89, 93, 98; 
Posiva 2012f, 105-110, 123-133, 137-141; Posiva 2012g, 104-105). For a comprehensive list of 
corrosion issues named in the application and the attached safety case see Table 5. 
Posiva's performance assessment identifies uncertainties in the initial state of the barriers and in the 
evolution of the repository system, and goes through the most likely lines of evolution and some 
variant and disturbance scenarios. (Posiva 2012a, 234; Posiva 2012g, summary, 25). According to 
Posiva, the analysis shows that the barriers will fulfil set performance targets for up to 10,000 years, 
with some possibility of incidental deviations. Regarding the corrosion issue, corrosion from the 
atmospheric and initially trapped oxygen, and from sulphide, which are named as the main corrosive 
agents in this time frame, is considered to be negligible. (Posiva 2012a, Executive Summary 19, 21; 
Posiva 2012g, 183, 281, 289.) Eventually, major climatic changes that may affect the repository 
conditions are anticipated. However, according to Posiva, no canister failures are expected during 
the first glacial cycle if the buffer performs as expected, and even if changes in the groundwater lead 
to chemical erosion, canister failures are unlikely in a time frame of 100,000 years. (Posiva 2012a, 
executive summary 21-24; Posiva 2012g, 380-385) With repeated glacial cycles the chance for 
canister failures rises but, in all scenarios, the calculated radiation release rates remain clearly below 
the set limits. 
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Table 5 Summary of the copper corrosion related issues discussed in Posiva’s construction licence application 
in 2012. 
Issues discussed  
Posiva Oy 
 
 
- Posiva presents construction licence application including 
safety case 
 
- Conducted research on: 
- corrosion before emplacement 
o atmospheric corrosion 
o oxidation 
- corrosion due to handling and emplacement  
o galvanic corrosion due to iron particles 
o corrosion due to surface discontinuities 
o corrosion due to plastic deformation of copper 
- stress corrosion  
o stress corrosion cracking 
o residual stresses due to welding 
o aerobic conditions 
o oxidation 
o surface reactions 
o copper-water interface 
o corrosion in anoxic water 
- internal corrosion  
o radiolysis of residual water 
o ammonia 
o radiolytic acid production 
- external corrosion in unsaturated buffer  
o salt contaminants 
o local separation of anodic and cathodic sites 
o wetting process 
o radiolysis of moist air 
- aerobic corrosion in the deposition hole  
o aerobic corrosion due to residual air 
o pyrite oxidation  
- copper corrosion in highly saline ground waters 
o corrosion under anoxic conditions 
- corrosion during buffer saturation 
o pitting 
o under-deposit corrosion 
o alkaline pore waters 
o microbial activity 
- corrosion after buffer saturation 
o sulphide corrosion 
o electrochemical, mass transport, redox, 
precipitation, and sorption reactions 
o pyrite and sulphate as sulphide sources 
o microbial activity 
o stress corrosion cracking under anaerobic 
conditions 
 
 
- external corrosion due to radiolysis of buffer pore 
water 
o temperature around the canister 
- corrosion in the case of an intact buffer 
o evolution of groundwater conditions 
- corrosion in the case of a partially eroded buffer 
o evolution of groundwater conditions 
o transport apertures of fractures 
o sulphide concentration in the groundwater 
o microbial induced sulphide production 
- corrosion in pure water 
 
- Additional considerations: 
- swelling pressure from the buffer 
- aggressive agents (e.g. nitrates, nitrites) 
- high pH leachates from cementitious materials 
- canister corrosion’s effect on buffer 
 
- Broader considerations 
- heat transfer 
- performance of the buffer  
- issues affecting the buffer 
- different evolutionary scenarios 
 
- No significant uncertainties concerning copper corrosion 
under aerobic and anaerobic conditions 
 
- The main uncertainties relate to the evolution of the 
near-field geochemical conditions 
 
- Under research:  
- the time-dependent variable amounts of sulphide that 
can reach the copper 
- capacity of the rock and filling materials to buffer 
infiltration of acidic and oxygenated water from the 
surface  
-  localised corrosion mechanism in the presence of 
dissolved groundwater species in compacted 
bentonite 
- different evolutionary scenarios 
- corrosion by pure water 
- microbial-produced sulphide 
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6 Overview of findings 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate risk communication, namely a dialogue in the 
exchange of risk-related information among expert organisations in risk governance processes. In this 
case study we focused on the dialogue between the nuclear waste management company, Posiva 
Oy, and the nuclear safety authority, STUK, paying special attention to the copper corrosion issue, 
which is one of the key challenges in the geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The study aimed at 
finding out 1) how the implementer, Posiva, has presented research on the issue of copper corrosion 
and copper corrosion in their RTD programme, since 2003, and the subsequent NWM programme in 
2012, 2) how the regulator, STUK, has assessed the challenge and reacted to what Posiva has 
presented, 3) how the risk of copper corrosion is co-constructed by Posiva and STUK and 4) what the 
long-standing risk dialogue reveals about the transformation of the regulatory culture and the 
relationship of the parties.  
Our findings suggest that the need for a spent nuclear fuel repository tends to shape Posiva’s 
conceptualisation of the debate, and thus, it is formulated in an optimistic light right from the first 
RTD report in 2003, but still conceding its lack of knowledge on many different aspects related to the 
copper corrosion issues. The results suggest that Posiva’s programmes evolved from merely 
presenting a situation to more focused and extensive discussions. Meanwhile, the primacy of the 
ultimate safety of radioactive waste disposal seems to determine how STUK frames the copper 
corrosion issue as a significant challenge to be dealt with in a way that leaves no room for error, but 
at the same time, as the safe final disposal is seen as the goal, supporting Posiva in pushing ahead in 
its RTD work, giving credit to Posiva’s advancements advances and identifying the areas needing 
further research.  
Since the dyadic risk communication between the organisations is determined by the Finnish 
legislation, STUK exercised its right to demand information, while the implementer, Posiva, was 
compelled to comply with the requirements. Nevertheless, the organisations appeared to operate on 
an equal footing in that they both pursued the successful development of a safe repository for spent 
nuclear fuel. However, the results show that under the normal steady flow of interaction, the risk 
governance process is oriented towards mutual learning and improvement, but at the time of crucial 
decision-making extra tensions come into the relationship. In 2003, only two years after the first step 
of the authorisation process and after having its DiP ratified by Parliament, the dialogue between 
Posiva and STUK set the stage for the copper corrosion debate. In 2003 Posiva described their own 
and their co-operative research on corrosion, but also disclosed their thoughts about aspects 
needing further research. Besides its own expertise, STUK employed hired experts to review Posiva’s 
RTD of 2003. On the grounds of the review STUK demanded further consideration, clarifications and 
research on several issues. In 2006 the second round of the dialogue, the risk dialogue became both 
broader and more profound considering the future prospects and possible concerns related to the 
long-term corrosion behaviour of copper in changing repository conditions. The increased coverage 
of the corrosion issues indicated both increasing knowledge about the issue, but also remaining 
uncertainties. STUK gave Posiva credit for enhancing its knowledge, but still pointed out areas in 
need of further research and identified weaknesses. STUK and its consultants deplored the lack of a 
coherent picture of the research, the lack of evidence on the long-term properties of the canister 
design and was of the opinion that early failure of the canister due to creep or stress corrosion had 
not been sufficiently addressed. Other clarifications and further consideration of other matters were 
also required.  
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The regulatory review process of 2009 confused the simple review process as indicated in Figure 1. 
At this stage the regulatory review process, i.e. the RTD review process, was affected by the 
authorisation process, i.e. construction licence review process. This diffusion of two processes 
seemed to raise the stakes and increased STUK’s criticism. Posiva prepared its RTD 2009 report, but 
at the same time it was asked also to submit so-called pre-construction licence application (pre-CLA). 
When STUK found the pre-CLA material insufficient in many ways, it also looked at Posiva’s RTD from 
this perspective. The criticism voiced by STUK was two-fold. On the one hand it expected a more 
comprehensive approach from Posiva and on the other hand it still required more attention to be 
paid to questions of corrosion. Interestingly enough, different perceptions of the pre-CLA by Posiva 
and STUK affected both of STUK’s reviews. STUK had expected a more holistic view in the pre-CLA, 
whereas Posiva had opted for something more like a compilation of research accomplished so far. 
Therefore STUK’s criticism was harsh. It deplored the lack of coherence, justifications and 
conclusions, but also Posiva’s ability to keep up with its timetables.  
Earlier tensions between the parties increased during the last regulatory review round of interest in 
2012-2013. The analysis of the documents indicated that STUK was intensifying its criticism, because 
Posiva had not taken earlier criticism seriously enough. Thus STUK first rejected Posiva’s NWM, and 
accepted it only after Posiva submitted clarifications and amendments based on STUK’s initial review. 
Here, too, the two processes, the regulatory review process and the authorisation process, 
intersected and affected each other creating a somewhat confusing situation. Both the NWM 2012 
programme and the official CLA were under review. In the NWM 2012 review process Posiva referred 
in many cases to material that was to be included in the CLA. One of the important criticisms by STUK 
was Posiva’s need for more time for certain of its studies. It was estimated that some studies would 
be completed only after the CLA review by STUK. The outcome of STUK’s review of the Posiva CLA 
will be known somewhere around the end of 2014. 
7 Discussion 
The results of the research supported the assumption that long lasting interaction between the 
implementer and regulator tended to shape the regulatory style. Both the existing literature on the 
Finnish nuclear regulatory culture and the case studied indicate that the regulatory culture is a 
mixture of a fiduciary and consensual approach due to the prominent role of the main actors, STUK 
and Posiva, and the total absence of or very limited opportunity for public participation. The 
stepwise decision-making and implementation process also affected the regulatory process, which is 
also stepwise. The Finnish nuclear regulatory culture can be deemed flexible, development oriented 
and, as such, oriented towards gradual learning and refinement. This regulatory philosophy provides 
more opportunity for a constructive dialogue between regulator and implementer, which can be 
beneficial for the development of technical procedures, but also leaves room for interpretations and 
control by the authorities. In the ideal case the roles of implementer and regulator should be clear-
cut, but the study of long-standing interaction indicates that engagement in dialogue has 
transformed STUK’s role in the direction of development orientation, thus shifting STUK’s input to 
the advancement of the project, giving it a sort of consultative role. However, at the time of the pre-
licence application and actual construction licence application STUK reviewed Posiva’s RTD and pre-
licence application more from the point of view of a regulator. 
The present study demonstrates that in some cases it takes a long interactional process to determine 
the seriousness of a risk, and even then it is not entirely sure whether all aspects of that risk have 
been considered. In our case the parties appeared to construct the risk through negotiations about 
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what is safe, how safe is safe enough, and what has to be studied in order to reach the certainty 
about safety. Also the aspects; when one knows enough to claim that something is safe, how much 
research is enough to eliminate uncertainty, how new research findings contribute to the 
enhancement of minimisation of risk and what does the countless investigations tell about the 
overall understanding of safety, were also covered. Moreover, our analysis clearly indicates that 
increasing the number of scientific studies and results produced by the implementer is simply not 
enough even to approximate the risk. The regulator must have enough regulatory power to demand 
further considerations, clarification and additional research, for instance, on different 
epistemological problems related to the risk. Thus, we emphasise the importance of the legislation 
and the institutionally secured position of the regulator. 
Even though the regulator may have enough regulatory power and enjoy powerful institutional 
status, the longstanding interaction may create convergence. Wärnbäck et al. (2013) warn about the 
tendency of the values and priorities of implementer and regulator to converge over time due to 
prolonged social interaction. In the Finnish case this rapprochement of the values and priorities could 
be seen in three RTD phases – those of 2003, 2006 and 2009 – but the analysis of the 2009 pre-CLA 
and NWM 2012 showed the withdrawal of STUK from a consensual regulatory style to a more 
independent and critical regulatory role, probably because of the intersection of two processes, 
namely the normal regulatory process RTD and the construction licence authorisation process. The 
diffusion of these two processes caused confusion for the implementer in 2009 as they produced a 
pre-CLA which did not meet the expectations of STUK. In the next phase, in 2012, STUK’s increasing 
dissatisfaction with Posiva’s work led to a crisis in the relationship. STUK rejected the Posiva NWM 
programme and only after Posiva provided a supplement was the NWM programme accepted, 
stressing that the new NWM 2012 programme was once again to be evaluated as part of the CLA 
review. The consensus and shared understanding achieved in earlier phases of interaction seemed to 
vanish in the pre-CLA and official CLA review processes. 
Besides the regulatory culture, an interesting question is the regulatory object. The study indicated 
that from 2003 to 2006 STUK’s regulatory object was more the R&D process or the studies related to 
the advancement of disposal project, whereas from 2009 to 2012, due to the approaching licencing 
procedure, STUK started to focus more on an overall understanding of safety. These two issues are 
understandably connected to each other, but during the regulation process the emphasis seems to 
change. Another interesting question is how the parties understood the regulation. Both Posiva and 
STUK have stated that the DiP ratified by Parliament in 2001 consolidated the dominance of the 
scientific-technical approach over the political evaluation. Both parties made the interpretation that 
the DiP closed the gates to political intervention and legitimated the fiduciary regulation with a few 
patrons obliged to make the ‘common good’ the guiding principle in their actions and excluding 
public involvement (see Renn, 2008, 358-361). This interpretation has persisted for over a decade, 
but after STUK’s review report expected at the end of 2014 the political evaluation of the CLA will 
begin.  
Further research on dyadic risk communication is still needed. Even after this study it is fair to state 
that the dialogue between Posiva and STUK provides excellent longitudinal data for researchers 
interested in investigating the exchange of risk-related information between these parties. Our study 
gave only a hint that the two parties are not monolithic entities, because there are many experts in 
both organisations whose interpretations of issues may differ. Further research could moreover 
focus on how both Posiva and STUK “use” their external consultants. This study was also partly 
concerned with regulatory cultures. One factor contributing to the interaction between Posiva and 
STUK is undoubtedly that the MEE has the highest tutelage in the field of nuclear energy. It has a 
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central role in the official process and the statements are in fact requested by the Ministry. However, 
the role of the MEE has not been under investigation as its role here is seen mainly in gathering and 
conveying the information. Still, one has to remember, for instance, that it is the MEE, which prepare 
the CLA for the Government to decide. In addition, both Posiva and STUK have also expressed their 
readiness to dispense with the role of MEE in R&D review process (see STUK 2010b, 1-2). A fruitful 
research design could be to compare regulatory cultures and regulatory regimes in different 
countries.  
An important finding was that debate on copper corrosion in pure, anoxic water was of only minor 
significance in the expert dialogue between Posiva and STUK, whereas in the Finnish and particularly 
in the Swedish public debate it has actually become an issue with the potential to cut short the 
fulfilment of the geological disposal of SNF. What does it tell about risk governance and regulatory 
culture? If some recommendation could be made on the grounds of the study, we would like to 
propose further consideration on the role of other stakeholders. The closed circle of interaction 
between the two expert organisations would benefit from the input of informed outsiders, who in 
some cases could provide valuable input for assessing related uncertainties and possible approaches 
to the risks identified. A professional risk debate between an implementer and a regulator in an 
institutionally regulated setting can be seen to improve safety, but it can also create and impose rigid 
methods of operation and inflexible ideas, especially if no intervention is forthcoming from civil 
society, politicians or the mass media. 
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